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To Walter Nelles the compensations of the Law -and of life-
were in the "lift and lilt of a hard fight, lost or won, with or without
pay, and with but dubious returns in glory, for something you deeply
care for." No life was more richly compensated in this coin of his
description than his own. He had a great and passionate feeling for
righteousness, for the integrity of man, for the conservation of civil
liberties. Heedless of his personal welfare, over-modest as to his own
good deeds, he was content to let glory pass him by. That he put up
a good fight, there is no one who can deny.
It must have come as a shock to each student in turn who came to
know Walter Nelles, the scholarly prober into judicial motivations, that
here was a man who for the major part of his professional career had
fought ferociously in legal battle on behalf of those who sought the
shelter of the Bill of Rights. It did not take long, however, to sense
the power of his love of freedom. For him, the Bill of Rights was
no negative instrument to serve as a constitutional barrier to social
change, but a guarantee to the individual of the fullness of the Ameri-
can prophecy of freedom of thought and conscience. If labels mean
anything, he was a Liberal. And because he was a Liberal lawyer, it
was natural to him to become the defender of Radicals whose rights,
as a small minority group, were constantly in jeopardy. In rapid suc-
cession he defended civil liberty cases involving charges of espionage,
criminal anarchy, sedition, and cases of deportation and the various
other forms of Radical baiting. At a time when "too proud to fight"
was dogma for a self-complacent democracy, but heresy for an individ-
ual, Walter Nelles had the courage not only to defend Pacifists, but to
be one.
It must have been a great surprise to his Radical clients that when
Walter Nelles came to Yale he could put aside the partisanship of the
advocate and special pleader. At Yale he renewed his fight on a higher
plane where his blows had an even more telling effect. Both in his
teaching and in his legal research his interest continued undiminished
in the rights of man. But in the best tradition of the jurist he most
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admired, Oliver Wendell Holmes, he gained an Olympic calm, and sought
objective truth and understanding. To the casual or incurious, his hesi-
tancy of speech. his nervous mannerisms. and carefulness of expression
may have indicated uncertainty or even confusion. One need only read
his writings to dispel such notions. His felicity of phrasing. his aesthetic
appreciation of expression showed clear the high standard toward which
he constantly struggled, and the incisiveness of his analysis demonstrated
how he endeavored to slough off the irrelevant. but at the same time
not to over-state or over-simplify his case.
Valter Nelles selected for special research the summary power of a
Court to punish for contempt and the problem of the labor injunction.
These seemingly isolated subjects in the Law have more in common
than their relationship to articles in the Bill of Rights. Both are prime
illustrations of the wide discretion entrusted to the Bench. In an analysis
of these, Walter Nelles struck at the jugular of the judicial process. His
concern was not alone in usurpation of power by the judiciary through
contempt proceedings or in the use of the injunction to crush strike
activities. They but epitomized in bold fashion the whole judicial pro-
cess. He was alive to the fundamental problems of the statesmanship
of the Bench and the processes of the Law whereby Judges determine
the pace of social change and influence the form of social organization.
A good workman in the Law, he sought understanding of its archi-
tecture and designs for a better structure. "Alongside the questions of
justice in particular cases is tile question of judicial power, which, like
all other power. is of an encroaching nature. I cannot feel that it has
so completely rid itself of restraint by principles that all principles may
as well be scrapped as worthless."
In an attempt to understand the judicial process he resorted to history.
His was not an antiquarian interest in legal history. It might well be
said that in the strict sense in which the words have come to be used
that he was not a legal historian. He scoffed at the sham of precedent
mongering. In Court he was willing to preserve the amenities and to
pretend adherence to the orthodox faith "that Impersonal Law flows
through judicial ministers who are impotent to affect it." He refused
to be bound out of Court by such a mechanical concept of Jurisprttdence
and parted company with "silk-hatted Jurisprudence" to explore the
social scene where experience pointed to the true sources of judicial
conduct. In his strivings "towards legal understanding" he called to
account the social movements, the economic developments, and the ideol-
ogies of the craftsmen of the Law.
His was a daring sortie into fields little trod when he published his
first articles. The nice turn of phrase and the carefully hewn epigrams
with which he studded his writing belie the hours of patient research
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and sweat he poured into the few articles his short scholastic career
permitted. In bold, seasoned strokes he painted in the background against
which the judicial process must be set. The new school of critics of the
Supreme Court, spawned by the current attempts to enlarge the Court,
would do well to take their lights and shadows from this artist who
worked with controlled emotion and without political exigencies as a
spur.
In his analyses of the judicial process, Valter Nelles rejected a rigor-
ous marxian interpretation of history as an over-simplification. While
he recognized that the economic interest was dominant, to him it was
not conclusive. He likewise stressed the ideal of freedom, the will to
power for the sake of power, human weaknesses, and competing sets
of social values and objectives. It may well be, as some will say, that
his was an over-simplified understanding of the marxian concepts. Cer-
tainly his own thinking concerning history was in a state of flux. There
were signs apparent of the surrender of his Liberal faith in a social
sense of right. The cutting slort of his writing by an early death has
deprived legal history of what could have been his full contribution.
Despite the abruptness of its end, Walter Nelles' life was full and
rounded. Better than any man in the Law that I know, he complied
with Holmes' injunction: "But if a man is a specialist, it is most desir-
able that he should also be civilized; that he should have laid in the
outline of the other sciences, as well as the light and shade of his own;
that he should be reasonable, and see things in their proportion. Nay,
more, that he should be passionate, as well as reasonable -that he
should be able not only to explain, but to feel; that the ardors of intel-
lectual pursuit should be relieved by the charms of art, should be suc-
ceeded by the joy of life become an end in itself."
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